

# Market Perceptions, Monetary Policy, and Credibility

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OeNB | SUERF Annual Economic Conference 2024 - June 2024

# Motivation

- Almost 95% of central banks **increased policy rates** from early 2021 to mid-2023 (BIS 2023).
- Two factors impact policy transmission effectiveness:
  1. The greater the **public perception of the central bank's actions**, the larger the impact on future expectations of interest rates, asset prices, spending decisions, and ultimately, inflation (Woodford 2005).
  2. A more **credible commitment to a long-run inflation target** enhances macroeconomic stability (Orphanides-Williams 2005).
- Has the financial market's perception of the ECB's reaction function changed? To what extent does the perceived monetary policy responsiveness to inflation contribute to the ECB's credibility?


# This paper

- Approach:
  1. High-frequency data to estimate response of expected nominal interest rates to inflation expectations,  $\phi$
  2. **Pass-through of short- to long-term inflation expectations** conditional on  $\phi$
- Findings:
  1. **Significant and sizable changes in  $\phi$**  after exiting from the ELB
  2. **Strengthened  $\phi$  enhances credibility** by reducing long-term inflation expectation sensitivity to short-term fluctuations.

# Data



- **Financial and survey** data on the Euro area from 2005 to 2024
- **Daily data** on short-run expectations:
  - ILS rates from Bloomberg
  - OIS rates from LSEG
  - Forecast of GDP growth rate from Continuous Consensus Forecasts
- **Quarterly data** on long-run expectations:
  - 6-to-10-year forecasts of inflation, GDP growth rate, and 3-month Euribor rate from Consensus Economics

## Short-term expectations



- I exclude: global financial crisis (2007:M8 - 2009:M8) and sovereign debt crisis (2011:M8 - 2012:M8)
- I use quarterly GDP growth rate forecasts before 2015:M4

# Correlation between OIS and ILS



# Conceptual framework

Market participants believe that the central bank follows a simple policy rule:

$$i_t = \rho i_{t-1} + \alpha \bar{i}_t + \phi(\pi_t - \bar{\pi}_t) + \tau(g_t - \bar{g}_t) + \mu_t \quad (1)$$

Taking expectations at date  $t$

$$\mathbb{E}_t[i_k] = \rho \mathbb{E}_t[i_{k-1}] + \alpha \mathbb{E}_t[\bar{i}] + \phi \mathbb{E}_t[\pi_k - \bar{\pi}] + \tau \mathbb{E}_t[g_k - \bar{g}] + \mathbb{E}_t[\mu_k] \quad (2)$$

- $k$  denotes a short-run horizon (**1-year, 1-year-ahead**)
- $\bar{\cdot}$  denotes a long-run horizon (**6-10 year**)
- Identification: 3-day window around **HICP inflation flash releases** (higher volatility of ILS and GDP growth rates) [▶ Details](#)


## Baseline results

VARIABLES	(1) Full sample OLS	(2) Full sample 2SLS	(3) 05-12 OLS	(4) 13-21 OLS	(5) 22-24 OLS
$\pi_{1y1y} - \bar{\pi}$	0.46*** (0.040)	0.59*** (0.084)	0.79*** (0.102)	0.13*** (0.016)	0.47** (0.185)
$g_{1y1y} - \bar{g}$	0.08*** (0.019)	0.15*** (0.046)		0.02*** (0.006)	-0.17*** (0.064)
$i_{1y}$	0.66*** (0.030)	0.62*** (0.032)	0.67*** (0.023)	0.89*** (0.030)	0.34*** (0.063)
$\bar{i}$	0.26*** (0.016)	0.29*** (0.021)	0.29*** (0.016)	0.09*** (0.007)	0.55*** (0.083)
Observations	564	4,098	143	324	85

- OLS: **3-day window** around the HICP inflation flash releases
- 2SLS: **macroeconomic surprises** on the dates of the HICP inflation flash releases are used as instrumental variables for inflation and output gaps

# The path of $\hat{\phi}$ and $\hat{\rho}$

Inflation gap coefficient  $\hat{\phi}$



Inertial coefficient  $\hat{\rho}$




- 4-year rolling OLS regression around the HICP flash release date (3-day window)
- $\hat{\phi}$  and  $\hat{\rho}$  stable between 2015-2021
- $\hat{\phi}$  increases (more aggressiveness) and  $\hat{\rho}$  decreases (data-dependent and meeting-by-meeting approach) since 2022

# Short- to long-term inflation expectation pass-through

I run the following regression:

$$\Delta\pi_{5y5y} = \sum_{i=1}^5 \left\{ \xi^i + \beta^i \Delta\pi_{1y} + \chi^i [\hat{\phi}_{1y1y}^i \times \Delta\pi_{1y}] + \theta \hat{\phi}_{1y1y}^i \right\} \mathbf{I}^i + z_t, \quad (3)$$

where  $\Delta$  denotes daily changes and  $\mathbf{I}^i$  is an indicator equal to 1 when  $\hat{\phi}_{1y1y}$  belongs to quantile  $i$  and 0 otherwise.



- The pass-through from short- to long-run inflation expectations decreases in  $\hat{\phi}$  ( $\chi < 0$ )

# Conclusions

- New method for testing perceived shifts in the monetary policy rule
- Robust evidence indicates a shift to a more aggressive monetary policy response to inflation exiting from the ELB
- Stronger perceived response to inflation is associated with lower pass-through from short- to long-term inflation expectations, suggesting a more credible commitment to a long-run inflation target

# Volatility of ILS and GDP growth rate forecast

Let  $|\tilde{y}_t|$  be the 3-day absolute change in  $y \in \{\pi, g\}$  **around the HICP inflation flash release date  $t$** ,

I estimate the following equation:

$$|\tilde{y}_t| = a + k_{-4}R_{t-4} + k_{-2}R_{t-2} + k_0R_t + k_{+2}R_{t+2} + k_{+4}R_{t+4} + \sum_{x=1}^7 b_x |\tilde{y}_{t-x}| + m_t + e_t, \quad (4)$$

where  $R_{t+x}$  is a dummy variable equal to one when data release occurs  $x$  days from  $t$ . [Return](#)

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	$ \tilde{\pi}_{1y} $	$ \tilde{\pi}_{1y1y} $	$ \tilde{g}_{1y} $	$ \tilde{g}_{1y1y} $
$k_{-4}$	0.002 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.003)	0.015* (0.008)	0.009** (0.004)
$k_{-2}$	0.043*** (0.012)	0.002 (0.004)	0.015 (0.010)	0.007* (0.004)
$k_0$	0.096*** (0.021)	0.014** (0.006)	0.050* (0.029)	0.027** (0.011)
$k_{+2}$	-0.050*** (0.010)	-0.004 (0.006)	0.012 (0.013)	0.001 (0.005)
$k_{+4}$	-0.030*** (0.007)	-0.003 (0.004)	0.004 (0.011)	-0.000 (0.004)
Constant	0.017*** (0.004)	0.014*** (0.003)	0.009 (0.007)	0.006*** (0.002)
Observations	2,345	2,345	2,358	2,358
R-squared	0.472	0.246	0.586	0.512
month FE	Y	Y	Y	Y

## Volatility of ILS and GDP growth rate forecast

Let  $|\tilde{y}_t|$  be the 3-day absolute change in  $y \in \{\pi, g\}$  **around the ECB monetary policy meeting date  $t$** .

I estimate the following equation:

$$|\tilde{y}_t| = a + k_{-4}R_{t-4} + k_{-2}R_{t-2} + k_0R_t + k_{+2}R_{t+2} + k_{+4}R_{t+4} + \sum_{x=1}^7 b_x |\tilde{y}_{t-x}| + m_t + e_t, \quad (5)$$

where  $R_{t+x}$  is a dummy variable equal to one when the monetary policy decision occurs  $x$  days from  $t$ . [▶ Return](#)

VARIABLES	(1) $ \tilde{\pi}_{1y} $	(2) $ \tilde{\pi}_{1y1y} $	(3) $ \tilde{g}_{1y} $	(4) $ \tilde{g}_{1y1y} $
$k_{-4}$	-0.004 (0.014)	-0.003 (0.005)	0.010 (0.016)	-0.007 (0.005)
$k_{-2}$	0.002 (0.014)	0.002 (0.004)	-0.006 (0.014)	-0.005 (0.004)
$k_0$	0.000 (0.010)	-0.004 (0.005)	-0.006 (0.012)	-0.003 (0.005)
$k_{+2}$	0.001 (0.008)	-0.000 (0.005)	-0.020* (0.011)	-0.010*** (0.003)
$k_{+4}$	0.005 (0.008)	0.000 (0.005)	-0.008 (0.011)	-0.004 (0.005)
Constant	0.021*** (0.004)	0.014*** (0.003)	0.014* (0.008)	0.009*** (0.002)
Observations	2,345	2,345	2,358	2,358
R-squared	0.429	0.242	0.586	0.510
month FE	Y	Y	Y	Y